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Abstract
Words such as what-d’you-call-it raise issues at the heart of the semantics/pragmatics
interface. Expressions of this kind are conventionalised and have meanings which, while very
general, are explicitly oriented to the interactional nature of the speech context, drawing
attention to a speaker’s assumption that the listener can ﬁgure out what the speaker is refer-
ring to. The details of such meanings can account for functional contrast among similar
expressions, in a single language as well as cross-linguistically. The English expressions what-
d’you-call-it and you-know-what are compared, along with a comparable Lao expression
meaning, roughly, ‘that thing’. Proposed deﬁnitions of the meanings of these expressions
account for their diﬀerent patterns of use. These deﬁnitions include reference to the speech act
participants, a point which supports the view that what-d’you-call-it words can be considered
deictic. Issues arising from the descriptive section of this paper include the question of how
such terms are derived, as well as their degree of conventionality. # 2002 Published by
Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
Words like what-d’you-call-it1 are seldom discussed in linguistic theory, yet they
raise both fascinating and fundamental questions about the nature of linguistic
meaning. To ﬁgure out what such expressions actually refer to on any given occa-
sion, interlocutors must rely especially heavily on knowledge assumed to be shared.
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1 Arbitrarily, I use the spelling what-d’you-call-it, intended to cover variation in pronunciation from
[jw tdujukh 1 et] to [jw d kh 1 et ]. What unites realisations of this expression is the pattern of stress, only
on the ﬁrst element what. In this respect, this is formally distinct from the compositional questionWhat
do you call it? [jw tdujujkl ı et], which places primary stress on call (see Section 3.4, below).
In this sense, expressions like what-d’you-call-it vividly illustrate the property of
linguistic practice as ‘joint action’ (Clark, 1996a)—when John turns to Mary and
says Pass me the what-d’you-call-it, he provides her with no descriptive information
about the thing he is referring to, but nonetheless he is likely to succeed in commu-
nicating what he means. Expressions of this kind are interesting not only because
they explicitly depend on interlocutors’ ‘inter-recursive’ common ground (i.e. not
just ‘what we both know’, but ‘what we each assume that we each assume that we
both know’; Enﬁeld, 2000: 45) for successful reference to be made (as deictic ele-
ments and anaphors do generally), but also because they have semantic speciﬁca-
tions which subtly account for the interpretations hearers make. It is not literally the
case that these expressions are ‘vacuous’ (pace Levinson, 1995: 232, Clark, 1996b:
331). It emerges from the examples discussed in this paper that, ﬁrstly, expressions
of this kind have meanings which are explicitly oriented to the interactional nature
of the speech context, drawing attention to the speaker’s assumption that the listener
can ﬁgure out what the speaker is referring to, and, secondly, that the details of such
meanings can account for functional contrast among similar expressions, in a single
language as well as cross-linguistically.
The paper contains two main sections. The ﬁrst section concentrates on data,
describing and comparing pragmatic and semantic properties of the English expres-
sions what-d’you-call-it and you-know-what, as well as a speciﬁc use of the Lao
distal demonstrative nan4 ‘that’, which has a primarily (but not exclusively) euphe-
mistic function in the phrase qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’. A feature of this section is the
proposal of explicit deﬁnitions of the meanings of these expressions. The second
section discusses a number of theoretical and methodological issues which arise:
ﬁrst, the claim that what-d’you-call-it and similar expressions are deictic expres-
sions of a certain kind (i.e. ‘recognitional’ deictics); second, the problem of where
and how to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics in the description of
these expressions and their use, and what to make of the suggestion that the pro-
posed meanings are merely ‘conditions of use’; third, the status of these expressions
as more or less grammaticalised, in comparison to explicitly compositional coun-
terparts such as the sentence What do you call it? and You know what; fourth, the
relative conventionality of these expressions in the linguistic system. The English
expressions what-d’you-call-it and you-know-what show a signiﬁcant degree of
conventionality, but there are nevertheless many other words—e.g. doodad, whatsit,
thingamejig—which do a very similar job. Furthermore, completely novel forms can
conventionally perform similar functions in small, closed speaker groups. The paper
concludes with brief closing remarks.
2. Semantics and pragmatics of what-d’you-call-it and you-know-what
2.1. What-d’you-call-it
Suppose Mary is power-drilling and John is nearby. She mislays the chuck key
while changing drill-bits, and the following exchange ensues:
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(1) Mary: John, where’s the what-d’you-call-it?
John: I put it back in the toolbox.
The exchange is a success.
Mary meant ‘Where’s the chuck key?’ but she did not use the expression chuck
key. She was thinking of the thing, and could not think of the word for it. (This may
indeed have been because she did not know the word for it.) A speciﬁc referent for
the very non-speciﬁc expression what-d’you-call-it was not only in Mary’s mind,
but she expected John to understand that she was talking about ‘the chuck key’ on
the basis of this semantically extremely general term alone. And he did, naturally,
since he knew what Mary had to be talking about. According to the usual power-
drilling scenario—part of John and Mary’s shared cultural common ground—the
chuck key was right then crucially required, before any further progress in the task
at hand could be made. The success of this exchange requires that both Mary and
John know these details of the typical power-drilling scene, that they each know (or
assume) that the other knows, and further that they each know (or assume) that the
other knows that they themselves know (Enﬁeld, 2000: 45). This is what is required for
the termwhat-d’you-call-it to successfully denote in this case ‘the chuck key’ (the thing),
by means of inferential processes which rely on mutually assumed cultural scenarios as
interpretative resources. And while successful reference in virtually any communication
requires this (e.g. when John says The car won’t start, Mary knows which car he means),
the term what-d’you-call-it (unlike car) provides next to no descriptive information to
narrow down possible reference (among virtually every nameable thing!).
However, the successful communication achieved in example (1) cannot have
relied exclusively on shared non-linguistic knowledge/assumptions in the given con-
text. The interpretation is constrained by stable context-independent semantics—
however schematic they may be—of the expression what-d’you-call-it. By saying
what-d’you-call-it, Mary provides John with very much less speciﬁc constraints on
interpretation than if she had said chuck key, but nevertheless still provides concrete
clues, namely that she was talking about something, that she could not produce the
word for this thing right then, but that she thought John would know what she was
talking about.2 These aspects of the message of what-d’you-call-it can be viewed as
part of its stable meaning. This is why Mary chose the word what-d’you-call-it in the
context of (1) and not a random word like table, carburettor, or the (let alone a non-
sense syllable or a non-linguistic noise). The term is to some degree conventionalised
(see Section 3.5, below, for discussion), and as such has a relatively stable meaning and
can be relied upon in just such contexts to lead the hearer to the right interpretation.
Based on the discussion so far, it is possible to suggest an explicit deﬁnition (in the
form of a paraphrase of the speaker’s message; Goddard, 1998: 18) for what-d’you-
call-it:3
2 I acknowledge that the deﬁnite article the in (1) also contributes to the message that the referent is
assumed to be given knowledge for speaker and listener. However, this does not aﬀect the general point
being made about the expression what-d’you-call-it and its contrast with similar expressions.
3 The components of the deﬁnition are meant as non-optional parts of a single complex meaning.
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(2) what-d’you-call-it:
- Something
- I can’t say the word for this thing now
- By saying what-d’you-call-it I think you’ll know what I’m thinking of.
The details of this deﬁnition account for restrictions on the usage of the expres-
sion. First, Mary had to be talking about something, which best refers to objects
(referred to by count nouns) like chuck keys, but also to substances (referred to by
mass nouns), like sodium bicarbonate, oral rehydration salts, and vitamin E cream:
(3) There were traces of what-d’you-call-it at the bottom of the test-tube.
(4) I need to drink some what-d’you-call-it.
(5) You should put some what-d’you-call-it on that dry skin.
That what-d’you-call-it should refer to ‘something’ accounts for its relative odd-
ity (but not necessarily infelicity) in place of adjectives, and especially in place of
inﬂected verbs and determiners:
(6) ?John is far too what-d’you-call-it.
(7) ?Mary said she would what-d’you-call-it the council on John’s behalf.
(8) ??Mary what-d’you-call-it-ed the council on John’s behalf.
(9) *There were what-d’you-call-it people there.4
Second, according to the deﬁnition in (2), Mary’s use of the word what-d’you-
call-it conveys that she cannot think of the word for the thing she wants to refer to,
(i.e. chuck key ‘chuck key’).5 This accounts for the following contrast:
(10) Where’s the what-d’you-call-it?. . ., you know, the chuck key?
(11) *Where’s the chuck key?. . ., you know, the what-d’you-call-it?
In (10), the speaker at ﬁrst cannot think of the word, and then is able to be more
speciﬁc a moment later when the word comes to mind. This represents a natural and
common ﬂow of events. Example (11) presents the opposite sequence, which does
4 This example is rejected with primary stress on the head of the noun phrase, i.e. with the same into-
nation as There were seven people there, and not with the same intonation as There were angolan people
there.
5 The second component of (2) states that there is indeed ‘a word’ for the thing, as the presence of the
word call in the form what-d’you-call-it suggests. Indeed, as one anonymous reviewer pointed out, this
speciﬁcation is one way of narrowing possible reference of this semantically very general expression.
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not make sense, as predicted by (2).6 The speaker who utters what-d’you-call-it in
(11) obviously can think of the word for the thing she is thinking of, since she has
just uttered it.
Third, by the deﬁnition in (2), in saying what-d’you-call-it the speaker conveys
that she assumes the addressee knows (or can know) what she is thinking of once she
has said the word. Given the context of her utterance in (1), Mary can quite well
make this assumption of John. However, if John were somewhere on the other side
of town, with no idea of what Mary was doing, and she called him on the telephone
and uttered the string in (1) with no contextual set-up (not that much would be
needed), communication would fail. John would naturally be confused at Mary’s
assumption—explicitly communicated by her use of the expression what-d’you-call-
it—that he should know what she means.
These observations about what-d’you-call-it apply, mutatis mutandis, to what’s-
her-name and what’s-his-name. These expressions refer to people rather than to
things, maintaining a gender distinction in the incorporated third-person singular
pronouns. The following deﬁnition of what’s-his-name shows the parallels:
(12) what’s-his-name
- Someone (male)
- I can’t say this person’s name now
- By saying what’s-his-name I think you’ll know who I’m thinking of.
2.2. You-know-what7
Despite the semantic generality and heavy context-reliance of expressions like
what-d’you-call-it, they nevertheless contrast with similar expressions in essentially
predictable ways. Compare (1) with the following:
(13) Mary: John, where’s the you-know-what?
In both (13) and (1) Mary does not say the word for the thing she is thinking
about, and also in both cases by using a ‘vacuous’ word, she is assuming that John
knows (or can ﬁgure out) what she is talking about. [Indeed, in (13) she is ‘literally
6 There are in fact two circumstances in which (11) can be felicitous. As one reviewer pointed out, (11)
is ﬁne if what-d’you-call-it is interpreted as a reference to a previous utterance, and only secondarily to
the chuck key—i.e. in a case where the term what-d’you-call-it had been used previously (i.e. by John),
and is being ironically indexed by its use in the present context of identifying the chuck key. This would
essentially amount to using the what-d’you-call-it as a proper name for ‘the chuck key’. Secondly, as
Steve Levinson points out in a personal communication, (11) could also occur in a situation in which the
speaker, having uttered the ﬁrst clause, has become unsure whether chuck key was the right word after all.
This would in essence be a repair, signaling a change in the speaker’s conﬁdence as to the appropriateness
of their choice of words. In this case, the relevant conditions (i.e. what the speaker wants to say about
whether she knows the word for the referent) change midstream, allowing (11) to make sense.
7 I exclude from this discussion the expression Ya know what?, an idiom used for inviting the hearer
to take up on the speaker’s oﬀer to surprise them with some notable piece of information.
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saying’ that John knows.] But the expressions what-d’you-call-it and you-know-
what do not have the same meaning. We cannot assume that Mary has the same
communicative intention in uttering (13) as she has in (1). John receives somewhat
diﬀerent clues for inferring what Mary is talking about. Those clues are apparently
in the semantics of the lexical items.
As suggested by the lexical components of you-know-what, the speaker is
expressing an assumption that the addressee ‘knows what’ she is talking about.
Semantically, you-know-what has this in common with what-d’you-call-it. But the
crucial diﬀerence between the two expressions concerns what the speaker commu-
nicates about her reason for not saying the word for the thing in mind.
Suppose Mary’s utterance in (13) emerged in the same context given for (1). She
would no longer be saying that she can’t say chuck key, but that she doesn’t want to
(knowing that she doesn’t have to). Perhaps John is accustomed to losing or hiding
the chuck key, and she is tired of constantly asking him where it is. By saying you-
know-what instead of chuck key, she is underscoring this point, namely that she
deliberately chooses not to say the word, since it should be quite clear to John what
she is talking about. This has a kind of ‘accusing’ force, which what-d’you-call-it
could not achieve. More commonly, you-know-what may have both ‘avoidance’ and
‘conspiratorial’ functions, whereby a speaker deliberately avoids saying a certain word,
either to prevent potentially overhearing third parties from understanding, and/or to
create a collusive air between interlocutors. Suppose that John and Mary are expatriate
Australians in a tropical country, hosting a function for their compatriots. They have
had a crate of fresh peaches ﬂown in for the occasion, knowing that their guests would
cherish the opportunity to indulge. Once dinner is ﬁnished, John says to Mary:
(14) I think it’s time to serve the you-know-whats.
John could have said peaches, but avoids doing so, presumably to create tension
among the guests as to what to expect for dessert, and to allow the sight of the
peaches themselves to reveal the surprise. Mary of course is well aware of what John
is referring to. Furthermore, overhearing John’s utterance in (14), the guests are also
well aware that his expression is a deliberate avoidance, excluding them, and inten-
ded to be understood by Mary alone. This eﬀect could not be achieved by using
what-d’you-call-it, which with diﬀerent semantics provides diﬀerent clues for infer-
ence about what John must have meant. If he had said I think it’s time to serve the
what-d’you-call-its, his message would be that he ‘can’t say’ the word. Guests’ likely
interpretation would be that dessert is going to be something with a fancy name
which John has forgotten or can not pronounce. Pragmatics alone can not account
for this distinction (see Section 3.2, below).
Here are two more examples of this avoidance/conspiracy function of you-know-
what:
(15) Did you bring any you-know-what? (e.g. ‘marijuana’, to a party)
(16) Look, his you-know-what is not on straight. (e.g. lecturer’s ‘hairpiece’)
106 N.J. Enﬁeld / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 101–117
In each case, the reference of you-know-what is crucially dependent on both the
situation and the speakers’ common ground, and each of the uses may have a rather
diﬀerent implication and/or connotation in diﬀerent contexts. But despite the lack of
descriptive information about the referent itself, the interpretations are not entirely
unconstrained. They remain anchored by semantic speciﬁcations of you-know-
what, namely that the speaker does not want to utter a certain word/expression he is
thinking of, because he knows he doesn’t have to (since in that context the listener
knows or can know what he is talking about).




- I don’t want to say the word for this thing now
- I don’t say it now because I know I don’t have to
- By saying you-know-what I think you’ll know what I’m thinking of.
As in the case of what-d’you-call-it, it is presupposed that there is a word for the
thing, a speciﬁcation which narrows possible interpretations. Also as in the case of
what-d’you-call-it, you-know-what has a related form, used for reference to people,
in which what is replaced by who:
(18) Here comes you-know-who.
(19) I saw John at the club again with you-know-who.
You-know-who (which unlike what’s-his/her-name does not distinguish sex) may
thus be paraphrased as follows:
(20) you-know-who
- Someone
- I don’t want to say this person’s name now
- I don’t say it now because I know I don’t have to
- By saying you-know-who I think you’ll know who I’m thinking of.
2.3. Cross-linguistic contrast—Lao qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’
Expressions like what-d’you-call-it do not have the same kinds of form and
function across languages, and this is an area of linguistic typology about which
very little is known. Let us examine a what-d’you-call-it type word from Lao
(Southwestern Tai, Laos), namely qan0-nan4, literally ‘that thing’.8
Since qan0-nan4 may simply mean ‘that one’, there is a range of deictic uses (rela-
ted either to the discourse or the situational context) which do not concern us here.
In contrast to typical deictic usages, in the usage we are interested in, identiﬁcation
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of a referent is achieved in the absence of any discourse antecedent or contextually
present object. Secondly, the nominal is treated grammatically as a predication (i.e.
taking aspect and modality marking). Consider the following example:9
(21) me`1 caw4 n˜ang2 bo`0 qan0-nan4 juu1 tii4
mother 2sg still not thing-that pcl pcl
‘Your mother’s not yet ‘‘that thing’’, right?’
The speaker assumes that my mother is very old, and he is checking that she is still
in good health. He uses qan0-nan4 to avoid explicitly labelling what he has in mind
(i.e. something about her being in a bad state of health—‘senile’, ‘weak’, ‘crippled’,
or what have you), presumably because this may be impolite or hurtful to my feel-
ings. Unlike in the case of English what-d’you-call-it or you-know-what, it does
not seem that the speaker has speciﬁc words in mind (i.e. informants do not suggest
speciﬁc words he must have meant, but talk in more general terms what he must have
been talking about). I suggest that what the speaker conveys here is that he doesn’t
know how to say what he is thinking of. The likely reason for this in example (21) is
that making his thoughts explicit would run the risk of creating an uncomfortable
situation.
A second example arises in discussing a poster of King Bhumibol of Thailand on
the wall of a shop in Vientiane, the capital city of Laos:
(22) A. caw4 hak1 phen1 bo`3
2sg love 3hon pcl
‘Do you love him?’
B. kaa1. . . qan0-nan4 juu1
So. . . thing-that pcl
‘Well, ‘‘that thing’’.’
B’s answer is, essentially, ‘yes’, but she uses qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ as an avoidance
strategy, due no doubt to the political sensitivity in Laos of openly declaring one’s
love of the Thai king. The Lao royal family met its demise in the socialist revolution
of 1975. Recently, increased exposure to neighbouring Thai culture has involved
Lao speakers in the fervent monarchism of their neighbours (Evans, 1998, 1999;
Enﬁeld, 1999b). While the Thai king is well-liked by many Lao people, there is
8 Qan0 is a classiﬁer which in numeral classiﬁer contexts is typically used with reference to ‘small things
that can be held in the hand’, but which in contexts of modiﬁers and/or speciﬁers (such as the demon-
strative nan4 ‘that’) has more general semantics, meaning simply ‘thing’ (Enﬁeld, in press). There are two
genuine demonstrative determiners in the Lao system, nii4 ‘this’ (neutral) and nan4 ‘that’ (‘non-proximal’).
With these meanings, nii4 ‘this’ and nan4 ‘that’ cannot be used independently of their nominal classiﬁer
heads. Nii4 may be used without a classiﬁer nominal head, in which case it has the adverbial meaning
‘here’, along with three other spatially deictic adverbials phii4 ‘right here’, han5 ‘there’, and phun4 ‘yonder’.
9 Lao examples are attested and re-checked/discussed with informants. Abbreviations are: 2/3 (second/
third person pronominals); hon (honoriﬁc); pcl (particle); foc (focus). Numerals on lexical items indicate
lexical tones.
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naturally a tension arising from the fundamental association of the Thai monarchy
with Thai nationalism on the one hand, and being a Lao national, on the other. By
using the expression qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ in (22), the speaker communicates that
she doesn’t know how (best) to say what she wants to say (namely, ‘yes’).
In the next example, the speaker has just asked me if I paid Lao Kip or foreign
currency for a recent purchase. At this time, the exchange rate for Lao currency was
much in favour of the dollar, and he knew that the shop would have preferred to
take dollars. If I paid in Lao Kip, then I got a good deal. I replied that I did indeed
pay in Lao currency, and he asked:
(23) caw4 qaw3 ngen2 laaw2 haj5 laaw2 , laaw2 ka0 qan0-nan4
2sg take money Lao give 3sg 3sg foc.pcl thing-that
loot4 vaa3
right away pcl(q)
‘You gave them Lao money, and they just ‘‘that thing’’-ed right away?’
The speaker is avoiding explicitly referring to the exchange of money for goods,
perhaps for two reasons. First, to talk openly about money and ﬁnancial deals is to
an extent socially restricted, at least on a less informal level such as the context in
which (23) was uttered. Rachel Dechaineaux (personal communication) describes a
meeting in which Lao oﬃcials used qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ repeatedly to refer to their
own low salaries and their need for a pay-rise. Lao people are generally reticent to
voice their desire for change, especially in public contexts, and in this case employees
found the idea of asking directors for a raise so face-threatening that apparently no-
one could bring themselves to utter the words required. Not knowing how to say
what they wanted to say, speakers used qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ instead. (Note that
neither you-know-what nor what-d’you-call-it would be appropriate in English in
the same situation.)
A second factor which may have encouraged the speaker of (23) to use qan0-nan4
‘that thing’ for avoidance may relate to a superstition about openly mentioning
anything to do with good luck, or lucky deals that are not yet conﬁrmed. Since the
purchase in question was a brand new item, and since the speaker suspects I was
getting a good deal, it is possible that he did not want to risk ‘ruining’ that by openly
referring to it.
The examples of qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ have so far all been euphemistic, i.e. means
for avoiding saying something that could be taken badly, signalling that the speaker
doesn’t know how (best) to put it. However, people may also use qan0-nan4 ‘that
thing’ with a similar function not due to any perceived risk of social transgression,
but because they simply do not know how to put into words what they want to say.
For example, a Lao speaker trying to follow a telecast of the unfamiliar sport known
as rugby league said the following:
(24) tok2 phu`u`n4 ka0 to`o`ng4 qan0-nan4 maj1 no`q1
fall ground foc.pcl must thing-that new pcl
‘(When they) fall (to the) ground, (they) have to ‘‘that thing’’ again, right?’
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The speaker is referring to a constantly recurring event in the course of a rugby
league match in which, after a momentary pause in proceedings following the tack-
ling and grounding of a player who is in possession of the ball, play resumes with the
tackled player getting up, facing forward, and raking the ball, under one foot, back
to another player on his own team. This ‘raking’ of the ball back to one’s team-mate
is referred to in English as playing the ball. There is no term for this in Lao. The
speaker of (24) did not know how to refer to playing the ball, and indeed had no idea
whether there was a name for it at all. This use of qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ is subtly
distinct from English speakers’ use of what-d’you-call-it, where the speaker knows
or assumes that there is a word, and wants to signal that he just can’t say it (e.g.
because he can’t think of it). In the Lao case it is more a matter of ‘not knowing how
to say’ what the speaker wants to say, due either to being literally unable to verbalise
the thought, or to a judgement that the words one has in mind are inappropriate for
one reason or another and are therefore not ‘the way to say it’.
The following paraphrase deﬁnition is intended to capture the range of uses of
qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ illustrated in examples (21–24), above:
(25) qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’
- Something (happens/is the case)
- I don’t know how to say what I’m thinking of
- By saying qan0-nan4 (‘that thing’) I think you’ll know what I’m thinking of.
The above discussion has shown that the typical implication of ‘avoidance’, shown
most clearly in examples (21) and (22), is not a semantic speciﬁcation of qan0-nan4
‘that thing’, but emerges in context from a more general speciﬁcation that the
speaker ‘doesn’t know how to say’ what he wants to convey. Whether this is due to
social, cognitive, or other constraints depends on the context. The more general
phrasing of (25) allows it to cover not only the ‘avoidance’ examples, but also
examples like (24) which seem closer to the likes of what-d’you-call-it. In all cases,
qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’ communicates the speaker’s assumption that the listener will
know what is meant.
3. Discussion
So far we have concentrated on a range of speciﬁc examples of what-d’you-call-it
type expressions, with attempts to account for the data by proposing speciﬁc ‘infer-
ence-constraining’ semantic content in each case. We now turn to a number of the-
oretical and methodological matters which the reader will no doubt have been
considering already.
3.1. ‘Recognitional deixis’
Expressions like what-d’you-call-it are not found among the phenomena usually
listed as examples of ‘deixis’ (Lyons, 1977: Chapter 15; Levinson, 1983: Chapter 2;
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Anderson and Keenan, 1985, inter alia). However, one important reason for arguing
that they are deictic is that their meanings [as proposed, for example, in (2), above]
contain components like ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘this’ and ‘now’, which are deictics par excellence.
[Wilkins (1992: 132) uses this, among others, as an argument for considering inter-
jections as deictics.] Indeed, they present particularly interesting cases of deixis in
that they deﬁne as the search domain for establishment of reference the set of inter-
recursive assumptions deﬁning interlocutors’ ‘common ground’ (Clark, 1996a, b;
Enﬁeld, 2000). They have what Sacks and Schegloﬀ (1979) call ‘recipient design’,
and as such may be labelled ‘recognitionals’, i.e. ‘reference forms [which] invite and
allow a recipient to ﬁnd, from some ‘‘this-referrer’s-use-of-a-reference-form’’ on
some ‘‘this-occasion-of-use,’’ who [or what; NJE], that recipient knows, is being
referred to’ (Sacks and Schegloﬀ, 1979: 17). These authors concentrate on reference
to persons, not things, and are mostly interested in the use of names. However,
expressions like what-d’you-call-it are clearly ‘recognitional’ in the relevant sense.
As the discussion so far has shown, their use becomes possible ‘if recipient may be
supposed by speaker to know the one being referred to, and if recipient may suppose
speaker to have so supposed’ (Sacks and Schegloﬀ, 1979: 17). Himmelmann (1996:
230ﬀ) has used this sense of ‘recognitional’ to label a particular usage of demon-
stratives, and the Lao expression discussed in Section 2.3, above, is one example of
just this special function.
Relatively little attention has been paid to the theory and description of recogni-
tional deixis, this little understood and little explored function of deictic expressions.
Further research, especially of a cross-linguistic nature, is required.
3.2. Semantics or pragmatics?
Some may want to suggest that the meanings proposed in various paraphrase
deﬁnitions in Section 2, above, are not part of semantics but rather pragmatics. I
maintain, however, that the proposed meanings do belong in semantics, assuming
that ‘semantic meaning’ refers to what is communicated by a linguistic sign context-
independently and non-defeasibly. In other words, the claim here is that one can’t be
saying what-d’you-call-it and not be saying ‘I can’t say the word for this thing now’
and ‘I think you’ll know what I’m thinking of’.10 One might imagine a context in
which the speaker of (1) really can think of the word, yet for some reason wants to
avoid using it. But this would not change what is being said. That the utterance in
(1) means ‘I can’t say the word for this thing now’ does not mean that the speaker
actually cannot at that time say the word for the thing. It means that the speaker is
saying that she cannot at that time say the word for the thing. Whether it is true is
irrelevant to the semantics of the expression and/or its eﬀects in communication—
10 One issue I can not get into here concerns the status of these meanings as being of one ‘kind’ or
another—e.g. whether they involve ‘entailments’ or ‘presuppositions’, ‘procedural’ or ‘propositional’ spe-
ciﬁcations, and so on. These more detailed considerations must be reserved for further research on this
problem.
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just as delicious in This soup is delicious entails (among other things) ‘tastes good’,
even if I ﬁnd the soup unstomachable (and regardless of whether I want you to
believe that I think it tastes good, i.e. of whether I am lying or just being sarcastic).
Thus, I know one instance of a speaker persistently using what’s-his-name to refer
to a particular person (her son-in-law), even though she is well aware of his name.
This speaker is able to take advantage of the stable meaning of what’s-his-name to
persistently act as if she can not think of the referent’s name, thereby naturally
achieving a routine assertion of emotional distance. These pragmatic eﬀects depend
on stable semantics, along the lines proposed in Section 2, above.
3.3. Meaning or ‘conditions of use’?
According to one view (e.g. that of relevance theorists such as Nicolle (1998) and
references therein), semantic components of the kind proposed in Section 1, above,
could constitute ‘conditions of use’ rather than ‘meaning’. However, it is not clear to
me that such a distinction is applicable. The bottom line in a Gricean type model is
that a communicated idea either (a) is part of the stable speciﬁcations of a sign, or
(b) emerges via inference as generated by those stable speciﬁcations in combination
with aspects of the total context. The components of meaning explicated in, for
example, (2) are among the sign’s stable speciﬁcations, and are not merely dis-
embodied ‘instructions’ for when and/or how to use the expression what-d’you-call-
it. They represent what the speaker conveys to the hearer whenever the term is used,
and as such they constitute part of the meaning of the expression. It is true that these
semantic components make markedly diﬀerent speciﬁcations from referent-descrip-
tive ‘propositional’ meanings found in words like table and carburettor, and this is
no doubt what would lead some traditions to regard meanings such as those expli-
cated in (2), (17), and (25), above, as ‘procedural’ (cf. Nicolle, 1998, inter alia). The
proposed meanings do not specify properties of the referent itself, but make refer-
ence to speaker, hearer, speech act, and assumed-to-be-assumed-to-be-mutually-
shared knowledge. This puts what-d’you-call-it type expressions in a special
domain of meaning, but it is not clear that they convey a ‘type’ of meaning cut from
diﬀerent cloth.
3.4. Grammaticalisation/lexicalisation
How distinct is the lexical expression what-d’you-call-it from the syntactically
compositional expression what do you call it? First, they show signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in grammatical distribution, one being a complex and independent sentence
asking an explicit question about the addressee’s speech act of ‘calling’, the
other referring to a thing, and, accordingly, behaving like a nominal. Second,
they show corresponding formal contrast in stress/intonation (what-d’you-call-it
versus what do you call it?). The following examples show that the intona-
tionally distinct expressions are appropriate for diﬀerent contexts (with relative
stress and pitch of syllables represented by size and height of the ‘s’ below the
phonetic transcriptions):
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(26) (a) Where’s the what-d’you-call-it? [ıw d ekh l et ]
[ s s s s ]
(b) *Where’s the what do you call it? [1w tdujuıkh l et]11
[ s s s s s ]
(27) (a) That’s an unusual painting—what do you call it? [1w tdujuıkh l et]
[ s s s s s ]
(b) *That’s an unusual painting—what-d’you-call-it? [1w d ekh l et]
[ s s s s ]
Another obvious grammatical diﬀerence between the lexicalised expression what-
d’you-call-it and the sentenceWhat do you call it? concerns the possibilities for tense/
aspect marking. Thus, we ﬁnd What will you call it? and What will you have called
it?, but not *Where’s the what-will-you-call-it? or *Where’s the what-will-you-have-
called-it?. Note, however, that in the lexicalised expression both gender (What’s-his-
name versus what’s-her-name) and number (I found some what-do-you-call-them)
may be marked. Number-marking is revealing of the status of what-d’you-call-it as
a unitary lexical item, since it may also take simple-s plural marking (unlike inde-
pendent it):
(28) (a) John gave what-d’you-call-it to Mary for her birthday.
(b) John gave what-d’you-call-its to Mary for her birthday.
(29) (a) John gave it to Mary for her birthday.
(b) *John gave its to Mary for her birthday.
In semantic terms, the lexical and compositional expressions are clearly distinct.
What-d’you-call-it does not pose a question. If I say I’ve put the what-d’you-call-it
back in the toolbox, I am not asking you anything, nor am I referring to a speech act
I think you have made or that I expect you would make or could have made. There
is obviously a derivational relationship between the nominal what-d’you-call-it and
the question what do you call it?, but the relationship is not one of online deri-
vation in individual instances.
A similar relationship pertains between you-know-what (a nominal) and You
know what. . . (a declarative sentence). While in this case the stress/intonation dis-
tinction is less obvious, there remains a functional distinction between the lexical
and compositional expressions. Compare the following:
11 Example (26b) is distinct from the following, although it consists of the same constituents in the same
order:
(i) Where’s the—what do you call it? [1w t du ju ıkh l et]
[ s s s s s]
In this case, the two parts of the utterance must be intonationally distinct in a way not necessary
in (26a). Importantly, in (i) what do you call it? is not a constituent of what comes before, and
what comes before it is truncated. Here, what do you call it? is a genuine question.
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(30) (a) I saw you-know-who at the club.
(b) You know who I saw at the club.
Example (30a) states ‘who I saw’, while (30b) states ‘what you know’. To be sure,
(30a) also refers to what you know, but this is not the sentence-level focus. The two
utterances are distinct in a way in which the following are not:
(31) (a) I saw John at the club.
(b) John I saw at the club.
Both (31a) and (31b) state ‘who I saw’.
Another sign of grammaticalisation here is the possibility of plural-marking on the
whole expression you-know-what, while the same is odd, if possible at all, for the
word what (either independently or in the compositional expression You know what):
(32) John served you-know-whats for dessert.
(33) (a) John served what for dessert?
(b) ??John served whats for dessert?
Thus, the two English terms what-d’you-call-it and you-know-what are lex-
icalised, as both semantic and phonological distinctions with their non-lexical
counterparts reveal. They have apparently travelled a path from being sentences (in
one case a question about ‘what you call it’, in the other a statement about ‘what
you know’) to being nominals.12 Given that they are distinct from their co-existing
non-lexical source structures, it is important to be careful how much stock is put in
what is ‘literally stated’ in the lexical expressions. The fact that the morphology of
what-d’you-call-it ‘literally’ asks ‘What do you call it?’ does not mean that the
expression means ‘What do you call it?’, just as when fork means ‘eating implement’
it does not mean ‘point where branch splits in two’. Once satisﬁed that an expression
has two distinct meanings, the two meanings must be deﬁned each on their own
terms, and only then may one ask how they are related, and how ‘literal’ readings
may be relevant. While the perceivable semantic relationships between polysemous
expressions do not generate one expression from the other ‘online’, they nevertheless
do have iconic indexical value. That is, while one cannot make a priori predictions
about the precise relationship between two meanings of a single word or expression,
one can ﬁnd, after the two meanings are known, mnemonic ‘motivations’ or ‘expla-
nations’ for the meanings the word or expression happens to have (Keysar and Bly,
1999; Enﬁeld, 2002). So the relation between lexical what-d’you-call-it and non-
lexical What do you call it? is ultimately a secondary issue here.
Formal distinctions in stress/intonation of the kind observed for what-d’you-call-
it and you-know-what and their non-lexical counterparts are not available for qan0-
12 Lakoﬀ’s (1974) discussion of ‘syntactic amalgams’ is suggestive of mechanisms whereby this process
might begin. (Thanks to Steve Levinson for drawing my attention to this reference.)
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nan4 ‘that thing’ in Lao. However, there are clear distinctions in grammatical beha-
viour between recognitional and other uses of qan0-nan4 ‘that thing’. The most
obvious distinctive feature of the recognitional uses discussed here is their gramma-
tical treatment as predicates (i.e. taking negation and other deﬁnitive verbal mark-
ing, as illustrated in examples (21–24), above). This functional ‘extension’—from
nominal to predicative—is thus in the opposite direction to that of what-d’you-call-
it and you-know-what in English, which as we have seen are ‘extensions’ from pre-
dicative to nominal expressions.
3.5. Convention
An intriguing ﬁnal question concerns the level of conventionality of dedicated
recognitional expressions such as what-d’you-call-it and you-know-what. Firstly, it
is clear that what-d’you-call-it and many similar words are widely known and used
English lexical forms. The Collins English Dictionary (CED, 1979) includes entries
for not only what-d’you-call-it, but also doodah, doodad, hootenanny, thingamabob,
thingamajig, whats-her-name, whatsit, and others. These are widely known and
recognised among English speakers. But are these just variants of what-d’you-call-it
with the same meaning? Or do their speciﬁcations diﬀer in subtle but deﬁnable ways?
The comparison of what-d’you-call-it and you-know-what in Section 2, above,
shows that one cannot assume two recognitional expressions to be functionally
identical. The question is ideally approached with reference to natural examples.
Beyond the more conventionalised expressions just mentioned, there seems to be a
level of productive ‘derivation’ of recognitionals in English, based on (morpho-)
phonological similarity to prototypes such as what-d’you-call-it and thingamajig.
There are many less-well-known and even entirely novel blends and variations along
the lines of dooziewhatsit, thingamedoodad, and whatchamajig, and no doubt dozens
more. However, and importantly, there remain conventionalised boundaries on the
formal possibilities. The listener must still be able to guess from the form that a
recognitional expression is intended, i.e. that the form is meant as a substitute for a
word the speaker could have used. Were a creative speaker to step beyond the
licensing morpho-phonological conventions (e.g. by asking Where’s the foon?, where
foon has no hint of phonological similarity to what-d’you-call-it or thingamajig), no
recognitional function would be achieved. Listeners would assume that foon was a
word which the speaker meant to use, and which was simply unknown to the lis-
tener.
Finally, with regard to convention and productivity, it is important to note that
what-d’you-call-it type expressions can be conventional on the ‘personal’ as well as
‘communal’ levels (Clark, 1996b). Their ‘recipient design’ (Sacks and Schegloﬀ,
1979) makes them well suited to being coined, with exclusive forms, as in-group
conventions. With an exclusive form—say, hooterﬂanger—known and used within
an exclusive group of speakers (as few as two), such an expression is designed for
recipients within just that group. Working as they do with explicit reference to what
is shared between interlocutors, dedicated recognitionals naturally arise in ‘private’
contexts. When speakers share not just the necessary knowledge for recovery of a
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referent given no descriptive information, but also knowledge of a unique (supple-
tive?) phonological form as a private signal that such recovery is called for, their
solidarity is doubly underlined.
4. Concluding remarks
Little is known about the status of recognitional expressions cross-linguistically.
Do all languages have dedicated and conventionalised recognitional expressions?
How often are these transparently derived? How often are they related to proposi-
tions, as in English, and how often to demonstratives or other deictic expressions, as
in Lao? How often are there productive means for generating such expressions, on
both ‘communal’ and ‘personal’ levels? This is fertile and fascinating ground for
further investigation.
Words of the what-d’you-call-it variety are intriguing manifestations of the fun-
damentally interactional and cooperative character of language. Speakers constantly
monitor and take into account the interactional context and the common ground of
interlocutors in order to successfully communicate. Recognitional expressions like
what-d’you-call-it enshrine in their very meanings the notion of reference as a ‘joint
project’, and these simple but eﬀectively stable semantic speciﬁcations provide
anchoring information, constraining and guiding inference, and accounting for
contrast with similar semantically general expressions. Beyond these slim semantics
remains the uncanny ability of interlocutors to ﬁgure out each others’ commu-
nicative intentions with apparently so few clues.
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